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I. INTRODUCTION
In the misty mountainside city of Arusha, Tanzania, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (the "ICTR" or the
"Tribunal") is developing a body of law that has never existed before:
the law of genocide. 2 The ICTR was created by the United Nations
("UN") Security Council to prosecute those most responsible for
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in and
around Rwanda from January 1st to December 31st, 1994.3 From
2 William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law 1 (2000) ("'The fact of
genocide is as old as humanity,' wrote Jean-Paul Sartre. The law, however, is
considerably younger. This dialectic of the ancient fact yet the modern law of
genocide follows from the observation that, historically, genocide has gone
unpunished"); See Paul J. Magnarella, Some Milestones and Achievements at the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The 1998 Kambanda and Akayesu
Cases, 11 FLA. J. INT'L L. 517 (1997) ("Jean-Paul Akayesu is the first person in
history to have been found guilty of genocide after a trial by an international
tribunal.. .represent[ing] the first time an international tribunal has conceptualized
sexual violence, including rape, as an act of genocide").
S.C. Res. 955, art. 1, U.N. Doe. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
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April to July of 1994, Rwandans murdered each other4 at a rate five
times faster than even the Nazis could achieve during the Holocaust.5
This article will explain how efforts to reinforce the
impartiality of the ICTR have, paradoxically, rendered the institution
uniquely vulnerable to accusations of partiality. This is "the paradox
of impartiality" and it implicates not only the troubling legacy of
Western law in Rwanda 6 and the contentious relationship between
the UN and post-genocide Rwanda,7 but also the resolution of unique
complexities faced by non-Rwandan judges seeking to both
understand and "write" Rwandan history.8 An objective evaluation
of the ICTR's successes may only be achieved by understanding the
significance of these institutional challenges to the ICTR's efforts.
The ICTR's statutory mandate, geographic location,
innovations in judicial practice, and contributions to international
criminal jurisprudence are truly unique.9 Equally unique are the
ICTR's operational limitations and challenges. Although similar
limitations affect the operations of other international criminal courts,
the extent and consequences of these limitations are unusually
significant at the ICTR. Both substantive and procedural problems
have been significant and troubling on many levels. By considering
the nexus between these limitations and the imperative of
institutional impartiality, this paper will explain why those demands
make it structurally impossible for the ICTR to fulfill its legal
mandate of prosecuting those most responsible for the Rwandan
4 Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Post[-]genocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in
Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1221, 1245 (2000) ("The Rwandan genocide was
organized by the Rwandan government, supported by local authorities, and
undertaken by ordinary Rwandan men and women.").
HOWARD BALL, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE TWENTIETH-
CENTURY EXPERIENCE 156 (1999).
6 See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
8 See infra Part IV.
9 See U.N. Secretary-General, Implementation of the Recommendations of the
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations
Peace Operations: Report of the Secretary-General, Sec. Res. 977, pp. 3-5, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/977 (Feb. 22, 1995) (identifying Arusha, Tanzania as the seat of the
Tribunal notwithstanding the Rwandan government's protests that a Tribunal in
Rwanda itself was more likely to achieve accountability and national reconciliation).
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genocide without making significant political concessions to the
governments of UN member states, most importantly Rwanda itself.
Part II will begin with an overview of the circumstances
leading up to the Rwandan genocide of 1994. This section will focus
on the role of Western law in transforming the previously
socioeconomic distinction between Hutu and Tutsi into a racial
division of catastrophic proportions. Because the ICTR considers the
creation of a unified and comprehensive history of the genocide and
its causes to be part of its mandate, Rwandan history itself creates
unique problems for the ICTR. Since it simply could not operate
without the consent of Rwanda's government, the ICTR has been
required to make certain political concessions to that government.
The most controversial of these concessions is the decision not to
indict any members of the current government despite the
availability of reliable evidence against them. This discussion will
show how political developments since the genocide in Rwanda
constitutes the foundation of the ICTR's paradox of impartiality.
Part III will explore the connection between the ICTR's
commitment to impartiality and its corresponding dependence on the
political cooperation of Rwanda's government. Contemporary
accusations of "victor's justice" fail to take this connection into
account.10 Rwanda's contradictory role in first requesting and then
opposing the creation of the ICTR has enmeshed the court in a web of
unique political complexities that distinguish it from every other
international criminal court." In light of the political context in which
10 LARS WALDORF, "A Mere Pretense of Justice ": Complementarity, Sham Trials,
and Victor's Justice at the Rwanda Tribunal, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1221 (2010);
Leslie Haskell & Lars Waldorf, The Impunity Gap of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda: Causes and Consequences, 34 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 49 (2011); see Jean-Marie Kamatali, From the ICTR to ICC: Learning from the
ICTR Experience in Bringing Justice to Rwandans, 12 NEw ENG. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 89, 100-02 (2005) .
" Alison Des Forges & Timothy Longman, Legal Responses to Genocide in
Rwanda, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE
AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 54 (2004) ("Although the ICTR was created to
satisfy the needs of the people of Rwanda for justice, the government of Rwanda has
treated it with hostility. In the immediate aftermath of the genocide, the Rwandan
government asked the UN to consider forming a tribunal but then, displeased with
some aspects of the final Security Council resolution, cast the sole dissenting vote
against the tribunal's formation.").
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the ICTR was created, as well as additional infrastructural, legal and
financial limitations of the ICTR's early days,12 this section will
explain why common criticisms of the ICTR often reflect unrealistic
expectations. 3
Part IV will examine a few of the most significant legal
decisions issued by the ICTR.14 From delivering international
criminal law's first genocide conviction to defining rape and hate
speech as crimes of genocide, the ICTR's contributions to
international criminal jurisprudence are nothing less than
revolutionary. Because none of the ICTR's judges are themselves
Rwandan, the emphasis ICTR judges place on Rwandan history and
cultural understandings of legal proof and evidentiary admissibility
is highly significant. Judicial deference toward Rwandan cultural
understandings that the ICTR has incorporated into its jurisprudence
is a unique jurisprudential method of bridging the geographic,
cultural and linguistic 5 distance between the international
community responsible for creating the ICTR and the Rwandans in
whose name it was created.
12 Id. at 53 ("At the start, the prosecutor's office, which was originally housed in a
devastated hotel that was being converted into an office structure, had no logistical
and material support. Staff often lacked basic supplies such as pencils and paper, let
alone typewriters or computers. They lacked vehicles to go to massacre sites or to
travel to interview witnesses. These problems persisted largely because the
[Tribunal] had no powerful advocate on the Security Council or UN Secretariat.").
ERIc STOVER & HARVEY M. WEINSTEIN, Introduction: Conflict, Justice and
Reclamation, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN THE
AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 11 (2004) ("The reality is that these tribunals have
limited mandates and resources, restricted powers of subpoena, and no authority to
make arrests. With such limitations, they can never come close to meting out justice
to all war criminals, let alone serve as a beacon for reconciliation in countries torn
apart by ethnic cleansing and genocide. Even the idea that they will individualize
guilt and thus differentiate between the criminal leaders of a nation and their
deceived populations is fraught with ambiguity.").
14 E.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998);
Prosecutor v. Nahimana et. al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence
(Dec. 3, 2003); Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73(C), Decision
on Prosecutor's Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice (June 16, 2006).
Hassan B. Jallow, ICTR Chief Prosecutor, "Challenges of International Criminal
Justice: The ICTR Experience," http://ictr-archive09.1ibrary.cornell.edu/
ENGLISH/colloquium04/jallow.html (last visited September 1, 2012).
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Part V will conclude with personal observations and general
reflections based on the author's time spent working at the ICTR, as
well as an overview of how the ICTR's work has and continues to
expand the outer limits of international criminal law itself. This
article will conclude with an overview of the ways in which both the
successes and setbacks of the ICTR have already begun to provide
valuable guidance for future international criminal institutions to
carry on the ICTR's legacy of fighting impunity.
II: THE LEGAL ORIGINS OF THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE
A. Rwanda Before Colonialism
In the years immediately preceding the "hundred days'
genocide" of 1994, Rwanda - a tiny but increasingly overpopulated
Central African country 6 - was rapidly approaching complete
political collapse.' 7 With nearly all of the arable land already
cultivated, a birth rate rising between 3% and 3.5% annually, and
approximately 95% of the population dependent on subsistence
agriculture for survival,1 8 tensions between Rwanda's two largest
ethnic groups - the Tutsi and the Hutu1 9 - began intensifying almost
exponentially. 20 With the October 1990 invasion of the Rwandan
16 Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed 313, 319
(2005) ("Rwanda's average population density is triple even that of Africa's third
most densely populated country (Nigeria), and 10 times that of neighboring
Tanzania.. .By 1990, even after the killings and mass exilings of the previous
decades, Rwanda's average population density was 760 people per square mile,
higher than that of the United Kingdom (610) and approaching that of Holland
(950).").
1 Gerard Prunier, THE RWANDA CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 90 (1995) (noting
that after 1990. "the Rwandese political system was on the verge of collapse and any
strong push from outside would complete the process.").
8 CHRISTOPHER C. TAYLOR, MILK, HONEY AND MONEY: CHANGING CONCEPTS IN
RWANDAN HEALING 77 (1992).
19 Ball, supra note 5, at 15 (stating that prior to the genocide, the ethnic make-up of
Rwanda was 8 5 % Hutu, 14% Tutsi, and 1% Twa).
20 Larissa J. Van Den Herik, The Contribution of the Rwanda Tribunal to the
Development of International Lav, 21 (2005) ("Two concurrent developments mark
the four years that preceded the genocide. These developments first concern the
external attack on Rwanda by Rwandan refugees residing in Uganda, and secondly
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Patriotic Front ("RPF"), an English-speaking militia from Uganda
largely composed of Tutsi refugees from earlier ethnic clashes,
Rwandan society began an inexorable descent into chaos and terror,
ultimately culminating in the systematic and widespread slaughter of
approximately one million people in 1994, mostly Tutsi and moderate
Hutu.21
Despite the fact that power struggles between the two groups
had led to earlier massacres of Tutsi civilians in 1963, 1964, 1973,
1990, 1992, and 1993, relations between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda
had traditionally been characterized by inequality, but not violence.22
Although the division between Tutsi and Hutu predated the arrival
of the European colonial powers, it had historically been
conceptualized as a socioeconomic distinction, not a racial one:
If a Hutu.. .became prominent as a soldier or army
chief, or sufficiently wealthy in cattle, he might marry
a woman from a well-placed Tutsi lineage. The
descendants of such unions were often considered
Tutsi. Sometimes an entire Hutu lineage might be
elevated to Tutsi status by entering into alliance
relations with a prominent Tutsi group. Social
transformations such as these occurred frequently
enough to justify a specific term in Kinyarwanda,
kwihutura, which signified 'to become Tutsi, to cease
being Hutu.' 23
the changes on the internal political scene of Rwanda. The events were interrelated:
the invasion of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) from Uganda on 1 October 1990
added to the volatile political situation and eventually led to a complete
radicalisation of the political scene of Rwanda.").
21 JARED COHEN, ONE HUNDRED DAYS OF SILENCE: AMERICA AND THE RWANDA
GENOCIDE 13 (2007).
22 James E. Waller, Becoming Evil: HIow Ordinary People Commit Genocide and
V/ass Killing 221-222 (2002) (noting that, in precolonial Rwanda, "[i]nequality was
inscribed in the differential treatment accorded to each group and, as a result, the
potential for conflict certainly existed between Hutus and Tutsi. For most of their
history, however, the two groups coexisted relatively peacefully.").
23 CHRISTOPHER C. TAYLOR, SACRIFICE AS TERROR: THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE OF
1994 66 (1999).
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Logically, if the difference had been understood as racial, it could not
have been possible to change from Hutu to Tutsi by simply becoming
"sufficiently wealthy in cattle." 24 Although a significant degree of
social mobility existed between Hutu and Tutsi, this does not mean
that they were equal in terms of either population size or political
power in precolonial times.25 Hutu made up an 85% majority in the
country despite the fact that it was ruled by a Tutsi monarchy. 26
Most Rwandans believe that Tutsi and Hutu originally had
separate historical origins.27 The identity of "Hutu," however, was a
politically created ethnicity; the Hutu consisted of the aggregate
24 Id. (The socioeconomic nature of the Hutu/Tutsi distinction is reflected both
historically and linguistically; in Kinyarwanda, the native language of Rwanda, the
term "Hutu" literally means "social son, client, or someone who does not possess
cattle," while the term "Tutsi" is derived from the verb gutuuka, which means "to
enrich someone.").
25 Official Website of the Republic of Rwanda: History, http://www.gov.rw/pre-
colonial (last visited Feb. 22, 2012) ("While the relationship between the [Tutsi]
king and the rest of the population was unequal, the relationship between the
ordinary [Hutu], [Tutsi] and [Twa] was one of mutual benefit mainly through the
exchange of their labour. The relationship was symbiotic."). Independent research
has corroborated both the existence of a degree of symbiosis between the groups as
well as a fundamental inequality between them, with the Tutsi controlling the
kingship and, therefore, the apparatus of the pre-colonial Rwandan government and
economy. The "superiority" of the Tutsi during this time was reinforced both
institutionally, through the administration of the Tutsi kingship, as well as culturally,
through widely told national creation myths that asserted both a common origin
among Rwanda's three groups and the inherent "fitness" of the Tutsi for rule over
his brothers. See MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS:
COLONIALISM, NATIVISM, AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 80 (2001).
26 Ball, supra note 5, at 156.
27 Maya Sosnov, The Adjudication of Genocide: Gacaca and the Road to
Reconciliation in Rwanda, 36 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 125, 127 (2008) ("[M]any
Hutus believe that Tutsi herders were foreigners to Rwanda who considered
themselves superior to the Hutu pastoralists and took control of the region between
the eleventh and fifteenth century. The failure of the Tutsi-controlled government to
address the Hutu version of history further highlights the significant ideological split
between Tutsis and Hutus. Hutus and Tutsis view themselves as different ethnic
groups, even though they share the same language (Kinyarwanda), culture, clan
names, customs, taboos, and have intermarried for centuries.").
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population - originally of different ethnicities - who were
"subjugated to the power of the state of Rwanda."28
B. Rwanda Under Colonial Subjugation
Although Germany was the first European colonial power to
claim dominion over Rwanda in 1897, they "maintained only a very
light presence" there, granting considerable autonomy to the pre-
existing Tutsi monarchy. 29 At the end of World War I, the Allied
Powers stripped Germany of its colonial possessions and distributed
these territories among themselves.30 Soon, some of the colonial
powers began applying the English doctrine of "indirect rule" to their
new Central African "possessions." 31 Under this model of colonial
administration, precolonial governmental structures - like the Tutsi
monarchy in Rwanda - were left intact, allowing Europeans to
minimize their visibility while maintaining de facto control over the
colonies by selecting a class of native elites to administer their
colonial policies on their behalf. 32
28 MAMDANI, supra note 25, at 74 ("Hutu did not exist as an identity outside of the
state of Rwanda; it emerged as a transethnic identity of subjects in the state of
Rwanda. The predecessors of the Hutu were simply those from different ethnicities
who were subjugated to the power of the state of Rwanda.").
29 Prunier, supra note 17, at 25 (noting that the German colonial presence in Rwanda
lasted from 1897 to 1916).
30M. CROWDER, The First World War and Its Consequences, in GENERAL HISTORY
OF AFRICA IV: AFRICA UNDER COLONIAL DOMINATION 1880-1935 309 (A. Adu
Boahen ed., 1985).
3 Sally Engle Merry, From Law and Colonialism to Law and Globalization, 28 LAW
& Soc. INQUIRY 569, 580 (2003).
32 Rahman Ford, Comment, Law, History, and the Colonial Discourse: Davies v.
Commissioner and Zimbabwe as a Colonialist Case Study, 45 How. L.J. 213, 226-27
(2001); A. Peter Mutharika, Some Thoughts on Rebuilding African State Capability,
76 WASH. U. L. Q. 281, 282 (1998) (noting that "African subjugation was achieved
through a system of 'indirect rule,' originally devised by Lord Lugard in Nigeria,
under which the colonial state made conscious efforts to co-opt one ethnic group,
usually one not large enough to challenge the colonial power, through which the
state ruled the other ethnic groups. At the end of colonial rule, power was handed
over to the Africans in a manner that left political and economic power in the hands
of the co-opted groups. At the end of colonial rule, power was handed over to the
Africans in a manner that left political and economic power in the hands of the co-
opted group. Burundi and Rwanda are excellent examples of this policy.").
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It was not until the arrival of the Belgians, whose military
occupation of Rwanda in 1916 was made official by a League of
Nations Mandate in 1919,33 that the dynamics of colonial subjugation
truly began to lay the groundwork for ethnic violence and,
ultimately, genocide.34 For the Belgians in Rwanda, the choice of
which group to empower as a proxy for their both absolute and
"indirect" authority was clear: the Tutsi already existed as a
privileged minority, controlled most of the mechanisms of state
power, and even looked more like Europeans.3 5 The Belgians decided
that concentrating virtually all Rwandan power and privilege in a
carefully cultivated Tutsi elite would be the best way of maximizing
their control of the country while avoiding the economic and social
costs that would be required to dramatically restructure the entire
state in a more direct way.36 Consequently, implementation of
indirect rule in Rwanda consolidated virtually all political power -
which had, to a significant degree, customarily been shared between
Hutu and Tutsi on the local level - exclusively into the hands of the
Tutsi.37
In 1933, the Belgian colonial administration conducted a
census in Rwanda, culminating in the first ascription of Hutu and
Tutsi as not merely socioeconomic, but legal identities.3 8 The most
powerful instrument of this transformation, which bears immense
significance for the uniqueness of the ICTR's challenges, was the
introduction of Western law through colonial conquest:
3 Prunier, supra note 17, at 25.
34 Waller, supra note 22, at 222 ("The Belgians, in particular, were devoted to the
idea of a racialized Tutsi superiority and imposed a system of apartheid on Rwanda
in which Hutus were denied all privileges.").
3 Touko Piiparinen, The Transformation of UN Conflict Management: Producing
Images of Genocide from Rwanda to Darfur and Beyond 18 (2010) (noting that
colonial European explorers, missionaries and anthropologists in Central Africa
viewed the Tutsi "as a relative race to the Europeans, both descending from the
Caucasus, and therefore the Tutsi were 'bound' to lead and rule over the 'promitive'
Hutu... That the physical features of the Tutsi resembled those of the Europeans was
seen as proof of their superiority.").
3 6 Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
3 Mamdani, supra note 25, at 101.
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Wherever in the non-Western world the white man
carved out colonies, the civilizational project was
marked by a turn-key import: Western law. At its
outset, the Western colonial project was no less than
to wipe clean the civilizational slate so as to introduce
Western norms through Western law.39
The Belgians essentially used the 1933 census to legally construct "the
Tutsi as nonindigenous and the Hutu as indigenous." 40 This idea was
called Hamitism, based on the Biblical story of Noah's son Ham, who
was ordered by God to serve and labor for his brothers Shem and
Japeth as punishment for the sin of witnessing his father's
nakedness.41
As the yoke of colonial subjugation weighed down on
Rwandan society, the privilege and power of the European colonial
elite began, in the minds of many Rwandans, to become equated with
the now absolute privilege of the Tutsi elite.42 The ID card system
that the Belgians implemented through the census completed the
transformation of Hutu and Tutsi into now legally defined races,
3 9 Id. at 24.
40 Adrien Katherine Wing & Mark Richard Johnson, The Promise of a Post-
Genocide Constitution: Healing Rwandan Spirit Injuries, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 247,
260 (2002); Mamdani, supra note 25, at 80 (Hamitism, or the idea that the Tutsi
were both inherently superior to the Hutu and originally foreign to Rwanda, was
"shared by rival colonists, Belgians, Germans, English, all of whom were convinced
that wherever in Africa there was evidence of organized state life, there the ruling
groups must have come from elsewhere. These mobile groups were known as the
Hamites, and the notion that they were the hidden hand behind every bit of
civilization on the continent was known as the 'Hamitic hypothesis."').
41 Id. at 80 ("The account in Genesis tells of Ham's contempt for his father, whom he
saw drunk and lying naked in a stupor. While Noah's other sons covered their
father's nakedness, averting their eyes so as not to witness his shame, Ham did not
look away. Noah blessed the descendants of Shem and Japhet, but cursed those of
Ham. While Genesis says nothing about the descendants of Ham being black, the
claim that they were cursed by being black first appeared in the oral traditions of the
Jews when these were recorded in the sixth-century Babylonian Talmud; that same
myth depicts Ham as a sinful man and his progeny as degenerates.").
42 Id. at 14 (arguing that, in the context of colonial European racial doctrines, "Tutsi,
a group with a privileged relationship to power before colonialism, got constructed
as a privileged alien settler presence...").
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laying a legal foundation for systematic discrimination.43 "Thus, the
colonialists, in constructing [the Tutsi as] an alien race that could be
used to rule over the indigenous population, ultimately created
enmity between the Tutsi and Hutu."44 For the first time in Rwandan
history, the formerly malleable socioeconimic categories of "Hutu"
and "Tutsi" were now frozen into unchangeable racial identities.45
By legally requiring all Rwandans to carry state-issued
identification displaying each individual's name and ethnicity, the ID
card system facilitated the wholesale disenfranchisement of
Rwanda's Hutu population by categorically excluding them from
employment in the educational, employment and civil administration
sectors.46 Even "[i]n the educational arena, Catholic schools freely
and blatantly preferred Tutsi students at the expense of Hutu
children."47 While most of the best jobs were now reserved for Tutsi,
the Belgians instituted programs of forced labor for the majority
Hutu population.48 All of this was facilitated by the ID card system,
which created an "increased polarization between the ethnicities,"
and whose long-term consequences would not fully manifest
themselves until the 1994 genocide, during which the ID cards
ultimately aided "the Hutus in identifying fleeing Tutsis at
roadblocks and checkpoints so that they could be slaughtered on the
spot."49
In Rwanda after 1933, race was not only popularly conceived
of as a difference in ancestral origin, but it also functioned as the sine
qua non of legalized group discrimination.50 Although the process of
legally dividing the indigenous populations of colonized territories
into separate races was characteristic of the indirect rule doctrine, the
creation of legal structures - like the ID card system in Rwanda -
designed to disenfranchise native majorities functioned the same way
43 Id. at 258-59.
44 Id. at 260.
45 id.
46 U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info., The United Nations and Rwanda: 1993-1996, 10 United
Nations Bluebook Series 8 (1996) [hereinafter "Dep't of Pub. Info."].
47 Wing & Johnson, supra note 40, at 258.
48 Prunier, supra note 17, at 27.
49 Wing & Johnson, supra note 40, at 258-59.
50 Mamdani, supra note 25, at 25.
254 V. 19
THE PARADOX OF IMPARTIALITY
in colonies under direct European rule; under both direct and
indirect rule:
the law separated the minority of civilized from the
majority of those yet-to-be-civilized, incorporating the
minority into a regime of rights while excluding the
majority from that same regime. The law thus
enfranchised and empowered as citizens the minority
it identified as civilized, and at the same time
disempowered and disenfranchised the majority it
identified as yet-to-be-civilized.51
The phenomenon unique to the indirect model, however, was the
progressive identification of this "civilized" minority - in Rwanda,
the Tutsi - with the foreign colonizing power itself. The legal system
"blurr [ed] the colonial difference rather than illuminating it" by
"highlighting the commonality between the colonizer and a minority
among the colonized."52 Under the stress of colonial subjugation, the
complex and dynamic networks of personal relations that had
formed the fabric of social and cultural life in Rwanda were displaced
by the static, binary ascription of race. This new racial division of
colonial manufacture functioned as both the principal justification
for, and the primary mechanism of, legalized inequality in colonial
Rwanda. 53
C. From Independence to Genocide in Rwanda
By the time Rwanda achieved independence in 1959, a
majority of Rwandans, both Hutu and Tutsi, had internalized the
idea of Tutsi superiority and foreignness that served as a justification
" Id. at 25.
52 Id. at 27.
5 Id. at 22 ("If the law recognizes you as a member of an ethnicity, and state
institutions treat you as a member of that ethnicity, then you become an ethnic being
legally and institutionally. In contrast, if the law recognizes you as a member of a
racial group, then your relationship to the state, and to other legally defined groups,
is mediated through the law and the state. It is a consequence of your legally
inscribed identity.").
2012 255
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
for their legally privileged status under colonialism.5 4 With this
collective internalization of racial difference - the cornerstone of the
entire colonial program - this idea became central to both Hutu and
Tutsi claims to power; Tutsi would cite the history of the pre-colonial
Tutsi kingship as evidence of their superiority, while the Hutu would
claim true ownership as the natives of Rwanda by focusing even
further back in history to the time before the Tutsi supposedly
arrived.55 Tutsi extremists would draw upon this idea of racial
difference "to claim intellectual superiority" while Hutu extremists
would point to it as proof that the Tutsi were an alien race in Rwanda
and, therefore, entitled to nothing.56
With independence came representative democracy; for the
first time in its history, political power in Rwanda was proportional
to population size.57 Perhaps sensing the tidal wave of sociopolitical
upheaval that decolonization would bring, Belgium began replacing
members of the Tutsi political elite with Hutu citizens.58 In the
months immediately prior to the UN General Assembly's vote for
Rwanda's independence, outbursts of anti-Tutsi violence left
hundreds dead and thousands more were displaced and forced to
flee to Rwanda's neighboring countries. 59 For Rwanda, Independence
Day marked not only the formal end of colonialism, but also "the
first-ever documented case of systematic political violence between
the Hutu and Tutsi." 60
Mayor-General Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu military
commander, took control of the Rwandan government in 1973
54 See Wing & Johnson, supra note 40, at 258-59.
5 Taylor, supra note 23, at 57.
56 Id. at 55 ("Since Rwanda's and Burundi's independence in 1962, the main
proponents of Hamitism have not been Europeans - they have been Rwandans and
Burundians.").
5 Linda Maguire, Power Ethnicized: The Pursuit of Protection and Participation in
Rwanda and Burundi, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 49, 57 (1995) ("Led primarily by the Hutu-
dominated, anti-monarchy Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu
(PARMEHUTU), the push for majority-rule resulted in local elections in 1960,
which PAREMEHUTU won overwhelmingly.").
5 Id. at 55.
5 Dep't of Pub. Info., supra note 46, at 8.
60 Wing & Johnson, supra note 40, at 261.
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through a bloodless military coup. 61 During Habyarimana's rule, he
imposed severe restrictions on Tutsi employment in the public sector
and intermarriage between Hutu and Tutsi.62 Hutu military officers
were prohibited from marrying Tutsi women and all citizens were
legally required to carry the ethnic ID cards first introduced by the
Belgians. 63 Habyarimana also supported Hutu ultranationalist
movements that would periodically attack Tutsi civilians, leading to
the proliferation of Tutsi refugee communities in the borderlands of
Rwanda's neighbors. 64
By the late 1980s, approximately 500,000 Tutsis were living as
refugees in Rwanda's neighboring countries. Eventually, a group of
Tutsi refugees living near Rwanda's borders formed a militia called
the Rwandan Patriotic Front ("RPF").66 On October 1, 1990, the RPF
invaded Rwanda from the north.67 This was the beginning of a civil
war that would culminate in genocide. 68 It was at this moment in
Rwandan history that the Hutu extremists, now controlling the
Rwandan government, could make full use of the colonial ideology
6 Major Peter H. Sennett & Lieutenant Commander Gregory P. Noone, Working
with Rwanda Toward the Domestic Prosecution of Genocide Crimes, 12 ST. JOHN'S
J. LEGAL COMMENT 423, 433 (1997).
62 Magnarella, supra note 2, at 519-20 ("During [Habyarimana's] twenty-one years
of rule (1973-1994), there were no Tutsi mayors or governors, only one Tutsi
military officer, just two Tutsi members of parliament, and only one Tutsi cabinet
minister. In addition, Hutu in the military were prohibited from marrying Tutsi, and
all citizens were required to carry ethnic identity cards.").
63 Id.
6 4 Id. at 520.
65 Dep't of Pub. Info., supra note 46, at 11.
66 MICHAEL BARNETT & MARTHA FINNEMORE, RULES FOR THE WORLD:
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL POLITICS 137 (2004) ("In 1988 the
children of the first refugee flights from the 1960s formed the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF) as a political and military organization with the goals of repatriating the
Tutsi refugees and establishing a power-sharing arrangement with the Hutu-
dominated Rwandan government. In October 1990 the RPF launched an offensive
designed to topple the Rwandan government.. Even though many Rwandan Tutsis
viewed the RPF as an alien force and rallied behind the government, Habyarimana
played the ethnic card and branded the Tutsi minority a fifth column.").
6 Wing & Johnson, supra note 40, at 266.
68 Id.
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originally implemented to subjugate them.69 With the arrival of a
foreign and mostly Tutsi invading force, the colonial idea of a
fundamental racial difference suddenly became more than a
suspicion or belief among Rwandans; it was now a reality that could
very well mean the difference between life and death.
On April 6, 1994, the airplane of Hutu President Juvenal
Habyarimana was shot out of the sky by a surface-to-air missile,
signaling the start of the genocide. 70 Before the sun rose the next
morning,71 a systematic and widespread slaughter of unprecedented
brutality quickly spread through the country:
[R]ape, torture, mutilation, unspeakably cruel
murder; mothers forced to watch their children die
before being killed themselves; children forced to kill
their families. Mutilations were common, and
macabre ritual was evident: brutality... did not end
with murder. At massacre sites, corpses, many of
them those of children, have been methodically
dismembered and the body parts stacked neatly in
separate piles.72
By the time the killings stopped, one hundred days later, between
800,000 and 1,000,00073 Tutsi civilians had been systematically
6 ML Johnson, "Embodied Mind: Phenomenological Approaches to Cognitive
Science, Psychology, and Anthropology," Perspectives on Embodiment: The
Intersections of Nature and Culture, Routledge, New York & London, 1999, pp. 81-
102 ("One needs to remember that the Tutsi were killed as Hamites, not as Tutsi.
Whereas the Tutsi of precolonial vintage never claimed political privilege because
they came from elsewhere, the Hamites of colonial vintage were said to be 'a
civilizing influence' for no other reason than that they were said to have come from
elsewhere.").
70 Magnarella, supra note 2, at 518.
Jessica Raper, The Gacaca Experiment: Rwanda's Restorative Dispute Resolution
Response to the 1994 Genocide, 5 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 21 (2005).
72 JOHN READER, AFRICA: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE CONTINENT 677 (1998).
7 See, e.g., BERT INGELAERE, The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, in TRADITIONAL
JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT: LEARNING FROM AFRICAN
EXPERIENCES 25 (2008) (stating that "approximately 800,000 people died"); Paul
Kagame, Preface to AFTER GENOCIDE: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, POST-CONFLICT
RECONSTRUCTION AND RECONCILIATION IN RWANDA AND BEYOND xxi (Philip Clark
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murdered by their government and neighbors, and the RPF had
killed approximately 30,000 Hutu.74 Led by Rwanda's current
President Paul Kagame, the RPF took control of Kigali, Rwanda's
capital, ending the genocide by winning the civil war.75
D. The ICTR's Historical Challenges
One byproduct of the racialization of Rwandan identity was
the binary division of Rwandan history into two separate narratives:
a Hutu history and a Tutsi history. 76 Partly for this reason, the ICTR
considers the creation of a historical record of the Rwandan genocide
to be an essential part of its mandate.77 According to the judicial
officers of the ICTR, 78 this history writing serves two purposes: (1) to
promote reconciliation and justice within Rwanda; and (2) to serve as
a genocide-deterring resource for the rest of the world.79 As a result,
& Zachary Kaufman eds., 2008) (stating that "an estimated one million people were
murdered").
74 ALIsoN DES FORGES, "LEAVE NONE TO TELL THE STORY": GENOCIDE IN RWANDA
734 (1999).
75 Haskell & Waldorf, supra note 10, at 50 (2011).
76 Mamdani, supra note 25, at 267-68 ("Ever since the colonial period, the cycle of
violence has been fed by a victim psychology on both sides. Every round of
perpetrators has justified the use of violence as the only effective guarantee against
being victimized again.").
77 Although the responsibility of writing a historical record of the Rwandan conflict
appears nowhere in the Tribunal's Statute, the truth of this proposition is evident
from the Tribunal's jurisprudential focus on this history as well as a unanimity of
views on this subject among the judges I personally spoke with during my two
internships at the Tribunal.
78 During my second internship at the Tribunal, I became more familiar with the
Tribunal's judiciary and judicial practices by assisting in the research and drafting of
a judgment. Having worked closely with several of the Tribunal's judges throughout
the years, my overall impression is that these are highly competent, compassionate,
and dedicated individuals who have reached the highest echelons of their respective
domestic jurisdictions. In terms of knowledge, dedication and impartiality, these
judges exemplify the ideal judicial temperament.
79 See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law
and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the
Secretary-General, 38, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004) (objectives sought
by international criminal tribunals include "bringing to justice those responsible for
serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, putting an end
to such violations and preventing their recurrence, securing justice and dignity for
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the ICTR is in the unique position of actively mediating conflicting
historical truths while adjudicating the personal responsibility of
individual defendants.8 0
The complexity of this task is compounded in light of
Rwanda's historical experience with Western legal systems. This is
not to suggest that the UN should be viewed as a contemporary
proxy for the colonial powers of the twentieth century. On the
contrary, Rwandans seem to perceive the UN as a singularly
ineffective institution whose power is, at best, rhetorical.8 1 One basis
for general Rwandan skepticism toward the UN is the organization's
failure to act while hundreds of thousands of Rwandans were
slaughtered in the streets.82 After ten Belgian peacekeepers were
killed at the beginning of the genocide,83 the Security Council
the victims, establishing a record of past events, promoting national reconciliation,
re-establishing the rule of law, and contributing to the restoration of peace.").
80 SHOSHANA FELMAN, THE JUDICIAL UNCONSCIOUS: TRIALS AND TRAUMAS IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 12 (2002) ("The significance of all these legal cases that put
history on trial.. .is not only that they are revolutionary in the sense that what they
judge is both 'the private' and 'the public' but also, even more significantly, that in
them the court provides a stage for the expression of the persecuted. The court
allows...'the tradition of the oppressed' to articulate its claim to justice in the name
of a judgment - of an explicit or implicit prosecution - of history itself. The court
helps in the coming into expression of what historically has been 'expressionless."').
8 JOSIAS SEMUJANGA, ORIGINS OF RWANDAN GENOCIDE 229 (2003) ("The UN,
which Rwandans call Loni in their language, Kinyarwanda, is described as an
incompetent organization with the features of a children's tale. The adage of the
1960s, when the UN was involved for the first time in the internal affairs of modern
Rwanda, shows the international organization as inefficient: Loni ni
akavumburamashyiga. That is, Loni is a mythical animal in children's tales, called
upon when a disobedient child does not want to go to bed.. .Indeed, the UN is
rejected every time on the saying side and never on the doing side.").
82 L.R. Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide
236 (2000) ("In Rwanda, the anger and bitterness against the UN will last for
decades. Hundreds of thousands of victims of genocide had thought that with the UN
in their country they would be safe. But in the end the barbarians were allowed to
triumph. There is nothing the West can say now to the people of Rwanda to
compensate for the failure to intervene in their hour of need.").
81 Heather Alexander, Comment, Justice for Rwanda Toward a Universal Law of
Armed Conflict, 44 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 427, 433 (2004) ("On the day after
President Habyarimana's plane crashed, Rwandan soldiers killed ten Belgian
UNAMIR 'Blue Helmets.' The Blue Helmets had been sent to guard the Prime
Minister of Rwanda, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a moderate leader who was targeted
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responded by reducing the size of its peacekeeping force from 2,500
to 270.84
As a result, the ICTR attempted to expand the very limits of
Western law85 not only to facilitate the reconciliation of Hutu and
Tutsi - categories originally created by Western law - but also to
reconcile the international community with Rwanda. Paradoxically,
as we will now see, the structural characteristics that ensure the
ICTR's appearance of impartiality are exactly the same as those that
render the entire operation impossible without the continuous
consent and cooperation of Rwanda's government.
III. THE ICTR'S CREATION: INSIDE THE PARADOX OF IMPARTIALITY
A. Tensions between Rwanda and the UN
One of the most significant aspects of the ICTR's uniqueness
is the fact that the very same peacekeeping principles that prevented
the UN from taking action during the Rwandan genocide -
neutrality, impartiality and consent - are central to the ICTR's
legitimacy as an international court.86 Because the UN chose to
for assassination by Hutu extremists within the Rwandan government. The ten
Belgian soldiers were originally assisted in their mission by five Ghanaian UNAMIR
troops, who were separated from the Belgians after a rumor spread among the
Rwandan troops that the Belgian soldiers were responsible for shooting down the
president's place. Thus, only the Belgian soldiers were killed. After the murders,
Belgium withdrew its troops from the UNAMIR mission.").
84 James Sloan, The Use of Offensive Force in U.N. Peacekeeping: A Cycle of Boom
and Bust? 30 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 385, 417 (2007) (The Security
Council also downgraded this 270-member peacekeeping mission's mandate to
"only act[ing] as an intermediary in securing a cease-fire, help[ing] in the
resumption of humanitarian assistance and monitor[ing] developments.").
85 See GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 6 (2003) (Although
they incorporate many elements of the French civil law tradition, the ICTR's Rules
of Procedure and Evidence adhere more closely to the basic adversarial conventions
of Anglo-American common law).
86 BARNETT & FINNEMORE, SUPRA NOTE 66, AT 155 (The UN's rules for peacekeeping
and direct intervention in violent domestic crises "generated indifference to such
crises. They created an organizational culture where it was tolerable, even desirable,
to disregard mass violations of human rights not only in Rwanda but elsewhere,
most famously in Srebrenica [former Yugoslavia] in July 1995. Rwanda, in this
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categorize the violence in Rwanda as a civil war rather than
genocide,87 the doctrines of neutrality and impartiality actually
necessitated inaction until one of the warring factions emerged
victorious:
The paradox here is that at the time of the Rwandan
crisis the Secretariat's self-understanding of how to
best preserve its moral authority was tied to the rules
of consent and impartiality. But soon thereafter it
was the willingness to adhere to these rules in the face
of genocide that threatened its moral authority as
perceived by many publics. Although UN officials
tried to put the best face on their actions, relentless
questions and pressure forced them to begin to
acknowledge that their behavior was unbecoming
and that perhaps part of the reason was the
emergence of an 'institutional ideology of
impartiality.'8 8
Consent of UN member states is the foundation upon which the
ICTR's entire operation is built, primarily because it has limited
"resources, restricted powers of subpoena, and no authority to make
arrests." 89 The ICTR's lack of an independent arrest power gives rise
respect, was not an unfortunate mistake. It was the predictable result of an
organizational culture that shaped how the UN evaluated and responded to violent
crises.").
87 Id. at 149.
8 Id. at 155 ("The UN Secretariat argued during the peacekeeping expansion of the
early 1990s that it could not be placed in conflict situations like Somalia where it
was expected to be both a party to the conflict and a neutral, impartial intermediary.
Its failure to resolve these dilemmas led it to retreat to strict rules of impartiality in
Rwanda and to avoid any active attempt to stop violence. The result was to induce
an 'institutional ideology of impartiality' even in the face of genocide.").
89 Stover & Weinstein, supra note 13, at 11; Parker Patterson, Partial Justice:
Successes and Failures of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Ending
Impunity for Violations of International Criminal Law, 19 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
369, 387 (2010) ("Escaping Rwanda after losing the civil war to the RPF, the
genocidaires fled far and wide. Many ended up in neighboring African countries.. to
continue the war against the Tutsis... Rwanda, on its own, could never have
accomplished the capture of all these far-flung fugitives and, whatever its complaints
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to a corresponding dependence on states for the arrest, extradition,
and long-term incarceration of individuals indicted and convicted by
the ICTR.90 Thus, many of the processes necessary to fulfill the
ICTR's prosecutorial mandate are political, not legal.91
The one state whose cooperation remains both the most
essential and problematic for the ICTR is Rwanda itself.92 While the
ICTR is dependent on other countries for the arrest and transfer of
suspects, most of whom fled Rwanda around the end of the genocide,
the availability of Rwandan witnesses for travel and testimony in
Arusha has proven to be impossible without the cooperation of
Rwanda's RPF-controlled government:
When the chief [ICTR] prosecutor announced in 2002
that she had launched investigations of several high-
ranking RPF officers for [crimes against humanity],
the Rwandan government responded by imposing
new travel restrictions on Rwandans, making it
impossible for some witnesses to leave Rwanda and
travel to Arusha to testify in court. As a result, the
ICTR had to suspend three trials in June 2002 for lack
of witnesses.93
In addition to witnesses for oral testimony, ICTR access to
documentary evidence is equally dependent on the consent and
cooperation of the Rwandan government. 94 Rwanda was both the
first state to call for the creation of a criminal tribunal to prosecute the
about the [Tribunal], it must and does recognize as much.. .Nevertheless, securing
the capture of various fugitives has frequently been politically and legally
problematic, and some individuals remain at large.").
90 Jean-Marie Kamatali, From the ICTR to ICC: Learning from the ICTR Experience
in Bringing Justice to Rwandans, 12 NEw ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 89, 97 (2005).
9 Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, A iiorld unto itself The application of
international justice in the former Yugoslavia, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY, supra
note 11, at 41.
92 Des Forges & Longman, supra note 11, at 55.
9 'Id.
94 Justice Louise Arbour, The Prosecution of International Crimes: Prospects and
Pitfalls, 1 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 13, 19 (1999).
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masterminds of the genocide and the only state to vote against the
UN Resolution that brought it into existence:
Although the ICTR was created to satisfy the needs of
the people of Rwanda for justice, the government of
Rwanda has treated it with hostility. In the immediate
aftermath of the genocide, the Rwandan government
asked the UN to consider forming a tribunal but then,
displeased with some aspects of the final Security
Council resolution, cast the sole dissenting vote
against the tribunal's formation.95
Manzi Bakuramutsa, the RPF envoy to the Security Council, cast the
sole vote against the creation of the ICTR.96 Rwandan objections
focused on the following issues:
[Tihe [T]ribunal would not address crimes committed
between October 1, 1990, when the war started, and
July 17, 1994, instead of only the 1994 calendar year;
the [TIribunal would likely sit outside Rwanda; the
[TIribunal would not have the authority to impose the
death penalty; judges from certain states which were
involved in the war would be biased; and that those
convicted would serve their sentences in countries
offering prison facilities, instead of Rwandan jails.
The Rwandan delegate concluded that a 'tribunal as
ineffective as this would only appease the conscience
of the international community rather than respond to
the expectations of the Rwandese people.' Rwanda
claimed that the absence of the death penalty against
those guilty of genocide was the primary reason for
its opposition to the [Tjribunal. 97
95 Des Forges & Longman, supra note 11, at 54.
96 Makau Mutua, From Nuremberg to the Rwanda Tribunal: Justice or Retribution?,
6 BUFF. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 77, 84 (2000).
97 Id. at 84-5.
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This illustrates how the Rwandan government itself has been one of
the ICTR's biggest critics since the very beginning. The RPF-
controlled government's fundamental mistrust of, and reluctant
cooperation with, the ICTR is logically inconsistent with accusations
that the ICTR is simply a court of "victor's justice;" the "victors" in
this context being the RPF itself.
The Security Council's decision to override Rwanda's protests
seems to reflect a shared belief on the part of the international
community that granting the Rwandan government as much control
of the ICTR as they demanded would make the goal of objective and
impartial trials impossible to achieve. 98 By placing the court outside
of Rwanda, recruiting exclusively non-Rwandan judges, and
generally restricting Rwanda's participation in the trials to providing
witness testimony and documentary evidence, the Security Council
sought to make the ICTR as impartial as possible.99 However, these
are the same characteristics that give rise to the ICTR's institutional
dependence on the political cooperation of independent states. The
paradox of impartiality is this matrix of political compromises,
without which the ICTR would not be able to operate. Its
consequences are unique to the ICTR as a legal institution, even
among other international criminal courts.
B. Why the ICTR is Unique among International Courts
Just over a year before the outbreak of genocide in Rwanda,
the Security Council approved the creation of the International
98 U.N. Secretary-General, Letter Dated 1 October 1994 from the Secretary-General
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 138, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125
(Oct. 4, 1994) (expressing the U.N. Secretary-General's recommendation that an
international, rather than domestic, tribunal for Rwanda would promote impartiality,
expedite extradition and deter genocide in other countries).
99 Considering the aforementioned fact that Rwandan conceptions of history tended
to be sharply divergent in terms of race, the exclusion of Rwandan judges from the
Trial Chambers of the Tribunal was a method of excluding the presumptively
partisan prejudices of Rwandan judges in the interest of impartiality. By pursuing
objectivity through the exclusion of those the Tribunal is meant to represent, the
paradox of impartiality makes any alternatives impossible. See Mamdani, supra note
25, at 267.
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Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY").100 Since the
ICTR and the ICTY share many similarities - including the same
Appeals Chamber in the Hague, Netherlands - crucial differences
between the two courts are often overlooked.101 Although the ICTR's
charter was closely modeled after that of the ICTY, and both courts
share the characteristic of geographic remoteness from the territories
they exercise jurisdiction over, the political context for the ICTY's
work is dramatically from that of the ICTR. This is largely because
Rwanda continues to exist as a single nation while Yugoslavia does
not.102 Because the newer International Criminal Court ("ICC") is a
permanent institution with universal jurisdiction,10 3 and not a
temporary ad hoc tribunal whose geographic jurisdiction is limited to
one country as the ICTR and the ICTY are, political limitations on the
ICC's work are likely to be less restrictive than those that limit the
ICTR.104
An important difference between the ICTR and the ICTY is
the ICTR's statutory authorization to apply international treaties and
conventions, "regardless of whether they were considered part of
customary international law." 05 Despite the significant difference in
the two tribunals' sources of law, the ICTR's charter adopts the
ICTY's Rules of Procedure and Evidence, "with such changes as" the
100 Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The International Criminal Tribunals: Crime &
Punishment in the International Arena, 25 NOVA L. REV. 463, 464 (2001).
101 The Harvard Law Review Association, Developments in the Law - International
Criminal Law: 111. Fair Trials and the Role of International Criminal Defense, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1982, 1999 (2001).
102 See, e.g., Milena Sterio, Implications of the Altmann Decision on Former
Yugoslav States, 20 CONN. J. INT'L L. 39 (2004).
103 Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. INT'L
L. 149, 151 (2006) (Universal jurisdiction is a doctrine that empowers courts to
exercise jurisdiction over certain especially heinous crimes, regardless of the
location where the crimes were committed. This doctrine is relatively new in
international law and usually only invoked in response to a limited number of
crimes, generally including piracy, slavery, genocide, crimes against humanity, war
crimes, human sex trafficking, nuclear arms smuggling and terrorism).
104 McDonald, supra note 100, at 467.
05 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph
5 of Security Council Resolution 955, 12, U.N. Doc. S/1995/134 (February 13,
1995).
266 V. 19
THE PARADOX OF IMPARTIALITY
judges of the ICTR may "deem necessary."1 06 Thus, although the
rules of both courts are substantially similar, the uniqueness of the
ICTR's jurisprudential flexibility in relation to the ICTY, its "sister
court" in the Hague, is reflected in the UN Security Council's
assertion that one of its primary reasons for creating the ICTR was its
belief that:
in the particular circumstances of Rwanda, the
prosecution of persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law
would.. .contribute to the process of national
reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance
of peace.. 107
No such language appears in the ICTY's Charter.108 This difference
seems to represent an implicit recognition on the part of the UN
Security Council that the ICTR's mandate should include the
promotion of peace and reconciliation in Rwanda because the
paradox of impartiality would make these goals more difficult to
achieve in Rwanda than in the former Yugoslavia.109
From the outset, then, the ICTR seems to have been
envisioned as an institution whose substantive goals would extend
into the sociocultural realm of healing mass trauma, well beyond the
strictly legal realm of prosecution. Despite the fact that they are
essentially immeasurable and subjective goals, the UN Security
Council named peace and reconciliation as the intended outcomes of
10' S.C. Res. 955, art. 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994).
107 Id. at preamble.
10s Des Forges & Longman, supra note 11, at 52 (the ICTR Charter "differs from
that of the ICTY, where the contributions to peace and reconciliation were discussed
in Security Council debates but not specifically included in the resolution that
established the [ICTY]."); see also S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25,
1993).
109 Waldorf, supra note 10, at 1261 ("As a criterion for prosecutorial discretion,
national reconciliation is very problematic because it means the prosecutor is
engaged in highly speculative and political predictions about what will heal
Rwandan society-something well beyond his competence.").
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the ICTR's prosecution of those most responsible for the Rwandan
genocide. 110
C. "Victor's Justice" and the Paradox of Impartiality
Some commentators have noted that the assertion of a causal
connection between criminal prosecution on the international level
and the promotion of peace and reconciliation on the domestic level
is problematic.111 While some criticize the ICTR for its "politically
motivated" failure to indict any RPF members,112 the cooperation of
the RPF itself in facilitating ICTR access to witnesses and evidence
has remained reluctant at best and non-existent at worst throughout
the Tribunal's existence.113 The ICTR's dependence on the political
cooperation of Rwanda's RPF-controlled government has rendered
ICTR prosecution of RPF crimes against humanity practically
impossible.114 Despite the apparent validity of accusations against the
RPF,115 the nature of the work the ICTR has not done - prosecuting
''0 Stover & Weinstein, supra note 13, at 14 (noting that "international law and its
institutions are not designed to focus on the social and psychological processes that
guide how people form attachments in groups and communities. The law cannot, nor
should it, determine what the elements of trust are that help individuals and
communities build social networks that may lead to 'harmony.').
1 See Okechukwu Oko, The Challenges of International Prosecutions in Africa, 31
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 343 (2008); see also Donald L. Hafner & Elizabeth B. L. King,
Beyond Traditional Notions of Transitional Justice: How Trials, Truth Commissions,
and Other Tools for Accountability Can and Should Work Together, 30 B.C. INT'L &
CoMP. L. REv. 91 (2007).
112 Mark A. Drumble, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in
Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1221, 1274 (2000) ("The international community has
failed to hold RPF soldiers who committed ethnically driven civilian massacres
accountable, despite ongoing efforts to prosecute Hutu war criminals.").
113 Haskell & Waldorf, supra note 10, at 57 (In 2002, during an ICTR investigation
of the RPF, "the Rwandan government imposed burdensome travel restrictions that
prevented prosecution witnesses from going to Arusha to testify at the ICTR in
genocide cases. This move caused the suspension of three ICTR trials for lack of
witnesses, lasting several months and effectively blackmailing the Tribunal into
dropping investigations into RPF crimes.").
114 See id
115 Des Forges, supra note 74, at 692-735 (1999) (The Rwandan Patriotic Army
(RPA), the armed wing of the RPF that became Rwanda's national army after its
victory, used extensive force to establish its authority over society through massacres
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the RPF for war crimes - simply has no bearing on the value of
everything it has accomplished, particularly in the face of significant
institutional setbacks and limitations.
The concept of victor's justice goes back to the Nuremberg
and Tokyo tribunals,116 which were created by the Allied powers at
the end of World War II to prosecute those most responsible for war
crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the leaders of the
Axis powers.117 Critics of these earlier tribunals questioned the
legitimacy and impartiality of them for the following reasons:
The victorious powers declared what offenses
committed by the defeated powers were to be
punished and set up ad hoc tribunals consisting of
judges and prosecutors from their own countries,
using their own notions of criminal justice, to ensure
that perpetrators would be punished. Political
of civilians, usually portrayed as 'revenge killings,' and arbitrary executions");
Waldorf, supra note 10, at 1224. ("A [U.N.] appointed Commission of Experts
found that the RPF soldiers had perpetrated serious breaches of international
humanitarian law and crimes against humanity"); see Haskell & Waldorf, supra note
10, at 70 ("The ICTR's failure to prosecute RPF crimes stands in stark contrast to the
[ICTY] and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), which have prosecuted
perpetrators from all sides of their respective conflicts and successfully targeted
high-raking government officials.").
116 Catherine Ciss6, The International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda: Some Elements of Comparison, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103,
105 (1997) (Before the creation of the ICTY and the Tribunal, "the only instances in
which the jurisdiction of an international criminal tribunal had been exercised in
respect of war crimes were the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg for
German war criminals (1945-1946) and the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo
for Japanese war criminals (1946-1948). These Military Tribunals were set up under
fundamentally different circumstances to those surrounding the present Tribunals.
[The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals] were military courts established by the
victorious Allies as a part of a political agreement. The ICTY and [the Tribunal], in
contrast, are non-military courts established by the Security Council under Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter, as subsidiary organs of the United Nations.").
"7 See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 286, art.
6; Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, as Amended, April
26, 1946, reprinted in S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, A Decade of American
Foreign Policy Basic Documents, 1941-1949 433, 434, art. 5 (revised ed. 1985).
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decisions governed the choice of which individuals to
prosecute... At the same time, offenses committed by
the victors' own governments and commands were
entirely ignored.118
Considering the military and historical context of the Nuremberg and
Tokyo tribunals, the term "victor's justice" makes a certain kind of
sense: the victorious nations prosecuted and judged the vanquished.
The Rwandan genocide and the creation of the ICTR, however, have
been shaped by very different considerations. Instead of being
controlled by the victors of the Rwandan civil war, the ICTR has
instead been created and controlled by the UN Security Council - the
very same entity that had the power to intervene during the genocide
but did not:
Both moral and legal considerations inspired the
Security Council's resolutions to establish these ad
hoc criminal tribunals. First, from a moral
perspective, there was a collective feeling of guilt
among the international community, resulting from
the double failure to either prevent or stop the
massacres. This feeling of guilt reinforced the need to
have an impartial and internationally administered
system of justice which could punish both the
instigators and the perpetrators of the crimes. 119
Because it is impossible to equate the UN, which refused to
intervene in the Rwandan genocide, with the Allies of World War II,
who ended the conflict with the use of nuclear weapons on unarmed
civilians, cries of victor's justice ring far less true in Arusha than they
did at Nuremberg. The ICTR's broad mandate to prosecute
Rwandans most responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law in 1994 makes no distinctions between offenses
committed by particular political or ethnic groups; it therefore
theoretically includes crimes committed by members of Rwanda's
118 Peter W. Murphy, Judging War Criminals, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 325, 327 (2000)
(book review).
''9 Ciss6, supra note 116, at 105.
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current ruling party. 120 If it were a permanent court, criticisms like
the following that characterize the ICTR's failure to prosecute a single
RPF member as proof that the ICTR is nothing more than a court of
victor's justice, might bear more weight:
Victor's justice is an extreme form of selective
prosecution which occurs when only members of the
losing side are prosecuted. I am not suggesting the
[ICTRI could have, or should have, rendered equal
justice. The goal is not parity (i.e., indicating equal
numbers of suspects from each side of the conflict),
but rather some measure of impartiality.121
This argument vastly oversimplifies the nature and outcome of the
Rwandan massacres.
The mistake of dismissing the prosecutions at the ICTR as
little more than politically motivated exercises in victor's justice
consists of two equally false assumptions. First, the massacred
civilian Tutsi population must be assumed to be essentially
synonymous with the RPF: the same assumption that helped the
masterminds of the killings use the RPF invasion in 1990 as a pretext
for the genocide itself in 1994.122 Secondly, the decisions and practices
of the ICTR must be assumed to represent and further the interests of
the RPF-controlled Rwandan government. As described above, the
unreliability of this assumption is revealed by the Rwandan
government's varying levels of reluctance and hostility toward the
ICTR throughout the years.123
1
20 Id. at 50.
121 Waldorf, supra note 10, at 1273.
122 Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 66, at 137 ("Even though many Rwandan Tutsis
viewed the RPF as an alien force and rallied behind the government, [Hutu
President] Habyarimana played the ethnic card and branded the Tutsi minority a fifth
column.").
123 Haskell & Waldorf, supra note 10, at 57
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D. The ICTR's Unique Limitations
The ICTR is, by its definition as an ad hoc international court,
a temporary institution with limited resources that exists subject to,
and as the result of, the exclusive discretion of the UN Security
Council, a fundamentally political organization.124 Former ICTR
President Judge Erik Mose has described how the ICTR's operational
capacity was also severely limited by the scarcity of resources in
Arusha, problems the ICTY, located in the Hague, never had to
contend with:
The general infrastructure in Arusha was quite
rudimentary. There were few tarmac roads, very
unstable electricity and water supplies, and austere
living conditions. Telephone and fax lines were few
and unreliable. Computers and office equipment had
to be imported from abroad, resulting in delays.. .The
main challenge during the first [four years] of the
ICTR's history was to create a functional judicial
institution under difficult conditions, in an area
where there had never previously been any
international court.125
The delays and difficulties of the ICTR's early days were further
compounded by haphazard support from the UN Security Council,
the same body that had created it:
Having created the ICTR, the Security Council did
little to ensure its successful operation. The tribunal
was made an organ of the UN, whose bureaucracy
124 Judge Philippe Kirsch, The International Criminal Court and the Enforcement of
International Justice, 17 PACE INT'L L. REV. 47, 49 (2005) (Ad hoc tribunals "have a
number of limitations. They are geographically limited. They respond primarily to
events in the past. Their establishment involved substantial costs and delays. And
last but not least, their creation depends on the political will of the international
community of the day.").
125 Erik Mose, The ICTR: Experiences and Challenges, 12 NEw ENG. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 1, 2 (2005).
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was not only heavy and slow-moving but also
unfamiliar with the demands of judicial operations.
The UN failed initially to give the tribunal a regular
appropriation and obliged it to function on the basis
of short-term allocations, which meant that it could
hire staff on three-month contracts only. 126
In the early days of the ICTR's operation, the language barrier
between Rwandan witnesses and defendants and the ICTR's judges,
lawyers and legal officers also served to chronically delay and
complicate the proceedings:
Most Rwandan witnesses testify in the national
language, Kinyarwanda. During the first trials, there
were no interpreters trained in simultaneous
interpretation from this language into French and
English. The procedure was thus for a witness to
make a statement in Kinyarwanda, which was
translated consecutively into French, during which
time a simultaneous interpreter rendered it into
English. This procedure added days onto testimony
in trials for which the prosecution and defense
together sometimes called well over a hundred
witnesses. The ICTR also experiences long delays for
the translation of all documents into the necessary
languages. 127
Apart from significant practical difficulties stemming from the lack of
resources and support, there was also great legal uncertainty about
synthesizing common law and civil law traditions at the ICTR.128 In
126 Des Forges & Longman, supra note 11, at 52.
127 Daniel Terris, Cesare P.R. Romano & Leigh Swigart, The International Judge: An
Introduction to the Men and Women Who Decide the World's Cases 75 (2007).
128 See id. at 126 ("The procedural differences between common and civil law
traditions become even more visible in the context of an international criminal court.
Civil law judges and attorneys may not be familiar with the cross-examination of
witnesses or the notion of the inadmissibility of hearsay evidence. Their common
law colleagues may find communication between judges and counsel outside the
formal setting of the courtroom to be not only unfamiliar but, to their minds, a
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light of these obstacles, it is admirable that the ICTR was able to
accomplish anything at all. However, the most significant challenge
the ICTR faced was much more abstract than its infrastructural or
funding limitations: the problem of adjudicating the guilt of
individuals according to a legal concept - genocide - that had never
been used for that purpose before.129
Although an international consensus on the definition of
genocide dates back to the UN General Assembly's adoption of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide 1948,130 no international court had ever actually convicted
anyone for genocide as a legally defined crime until the ICTR issued
its first judgment - Prosecutor v. Akayesu ("Akayesu") - in 1998.131 As a
result, the ICTR operates in, quite literally, unprecedented legal
territory. The task of transforming a half-century-old idea into a
legally defined crime required the ICTR to formulate a new
jurisprudence of international criminal law at the same time that it
applied it to individual cases.132 We will now take a look at a few of
breach of ethics."); see also Rep. of the Expert Grp. to Conduct a Review of the
Effective Operation and Functioning of the Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Nov. 22, 1999,
U.N. Doc. A/54/634, p. 61, 82.
129 Alex Obote-Odora, Rape and Sexual Violence in International Law: ICTR
Contribution, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 135, 137 (2005) (With the
Tribunal's first judgment in Akayesu, it "became the first international tribunal to
indict, prosecute, and convict an official for genocide, and to hold that rape itself
could constitute genocide.").
1o Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9.
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951), adopted by G.A. Res. 260(III)(A), U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (defining "genocide" as committing any of
the following acts against members of a group with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, that national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing; (b)
Causing serious bodily or mental harm; (c) Deliberately inflicting conditions of life
calculated to being about the group's physical destruction in whole or in part; (d)
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and (e) Forcibly
transferring children of the group to another group).
131 David L. Nersessian, The Contours of Genocidal Intent: Troubling Jurisprudence
from the International Criminal Tribunals, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 231, 233-34 (Spring
2002).
132 See Terris, Romano & Swigart, supra note 127, at xix-xx ("[I]n their role as
interpreters of the law, international judges are reluctant radicals. Faced with the
challenges of creating new legal institutions, working in an uncertain political
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the ICTR's landmark decisions in order to understand the methods
and implications of this process.
IV. CULTURE ON TRIAL:
THE ADJUDICATION OF RWANDAN HISTORY ITSELF
A. The Akayesu Judgment
On September 2, 1998, the ICTR issued Akayesu, its first
judgment.133 Mr. Akayesu was the bourgmestre, the equivalent of a
mayor, of an area of Rwanda called Taba. 134 As such, he was
entrusted "with the performance of executive functions and the
maintenance of public order," exerting "exclusive control over the
communal police," and other public security forces. 135 The ICTR
Prosecutor's indictment charged that the killings of at least 2,000
Tutsi in Taba during Mr. Akayesu's tenure as bourgmestre "were so
openly committed and so widespread that, as bourgmestre, [Mr.
Akayesul must have known about them."136 Significantly, Mr.
Akayesu's indictment was amended - after the commencement of his
trial - to include charges that he facilitated the commission of sexual
violence. Although no evidence indicated that he had committed acts
of sexual violence personally, the ICTR determined that, "[b]y virtue
of his presence during the commission of the sexual violence... and by
environment, and trying to establish the credibility and legitimacy of their courts,
international judges have frequently forged new paths in law in situations where
there have been no road maps. By and large, however, they are not adventurers by
temperament. They are more likely to see themselves as compelled to break new
ground by circumstance, rather than seeking opportunities to make their mark by
developing new law. These tendencies have led to remarkable advances in
international law, but they have also the potential to undermine that stability and
legitimacy of the international courts if states begin to feel that the judges have
overstepped their bounds.").
13 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998)
[hereinafter "Akayesu"].
134 Id. at 4.
13 Id. at 1.12.
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failing to prevent the sexual violence... [Mr. Akayesul encouraged
these activities." 37
The Akayesu judgment began by reviewing the basis of the
ICTR's jurisdiction, the charges against Mr. Akayesu, his personal
history and the procedural history of the case.138 The judgment then
provides a detailed overview of the "Historical Context of the Events
in Rwanda in 1994."139 The inclusion of this historical narrative
reflects the Akayesu judges' consensus "that, in order to understand
the events alleged in the Indictment, it is necessary to say, however
briefly, something about the history of Rwanda."140 Interestingly, the
ICTR includes in this historical overview an implicit recognition of
the role of colonial administrative law in creating the conditions
necessary for the genocide to occur:
In the early 1930s, Belgian authorities introduced a
permanent distinction by dividing the population into
three groups which they called ethnic groups... In line
with the division, it became mandatory for every
Rwandan to carry an identity card mentioning his or
her ethnicity.141
The Akayesu judgment also addresses the question of how to
distinguish genocide from crimes against humanity and war crimes
137 Id. at . 12B; Sean Libby, [D]effective Control: Problems Arising from the
Application of Non-Military Command Responsibility by the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, 23 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 201, 205 (2009) (command
responsibility it a legal doctrine that renders superior "liable for any act committed
by a subordinate.. .if the superior 'knew or had reason to know' that the subordinate
would commit the crime and if the superior 'failed to take the necessary and
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof."' It is
essentially meant to nullify the "I was just following orders" defense).
"' Id. at . 3-77.
"9 Id. at 47.
1
40 Id. at 78.
141 Id. at T. 83; see also id. at T. 56 ("one can hardly talk of ethnic groups as regards
Hutu and Tutsi, given that they share the same language and culture. However, in the
context of the period in question, they were, in consonance with a distinction made
by the colonizers, considered both by the authorities and themselves as belonging to
two distinct ethnic groups; as such, their identity cards mentioned each holder's
ethnic group.").
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committed during a civil war.142 Generally speaking, international
criminal law recognizes violence based on the ethnicity of the victim
as genocide and violence based on the political associations of the
victim as a crime against humanity.143 After reviewing the relevant
evidence presented at trial, the ICTR conclusively determined that
the 1994 massacres constituted genocide because they "clearly.. .had
a specific objective, namely the extermination of the Tutsi, who were
targeted especially because of their Tutsi origin and not because they
were RPF fighters." 144
The ICTR's decision to begin its first judgment by
constructing a narrative exploring the political, cultural and historical
origins of the Rwandan genocide reflects the importance of two
fundamental considerations. On a practical level, the fact that the
ICTR's "trial judges come from a wide variety of legal cultures"
creates an enhanced need for these judges to educate themselves
about Rwandan culture and history in order to accurately determine
the individual guilt or innocence of a defendant. 145 This preliminary
familiarization process is typically unnecessary in domestic courts
but holds profound implications for the ICTR's work and,
correspondingly, any evaluation of its work.146
Apart from the cultural, national and legal diversity among
the ICTR's judges,147 the process of applying a legal concept without
precedent - genocide - to the question of individual guilt required
the Akayesu court to develop new procedures and doctrines capable
142 Id. at 1 12-125.
143 David Luban, Calling Genocide by its Rightful Name: Lemkin's Word, Darfur,
and the UN Report, 7 CHI. J. INT'L L. 303, 311 (2006).
144 Akayesu, supra note 133, at 125.
145 M0se, supra note 125, at 13.
146 See, e.g., Des Forges & Longman, supra note 11, at 52-53 ("Many prosecutors
came from academia or human rights organizations with little or no experience of
criminal prosecutions. Similarly, investigators, drawn largely from police forces
from around the world, had no experience of investigating crimes of such magnitude.
Virtually none of the tribunal's staff, at least in the early years, knew anything about
the history and culture of Rwanda.").
147 Terris, Romano & Swigart, supra note 127, at 63 ("International courts are
without a doubt more heterogeneous than their national counterparts. This is
simultaneously their greatest weakness and greatest strength.").
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of achieving well-informed yet impartial justice.148 This process, in
turn, required the Akayesu judges to imbue the proceedings with a
unique degree of judicial creativity and flexibility in selecting sources
of law:
Because of the tension between theory and practice -
between the need to follow the law as it is written and
the need to interpret law so as to effectively carry out
the mission entrusted to them - international judges
tend to approach precedent both boldly and gingerly
at the same time. They are reluctant radicals. 149
The judicial freedom to select from a diverse array of extra-legal
evidentiary sources is a liberty unique to criminal adjudication on the
international level. 150 It also bears great significance in terms of the
ICTR's ability and willingness to take cultural considerations into
account when evaluating the credibility of witnesses:
[Ilt is a particular feature of the Rwandan culture that
people are not always direct in answering questions,
especially if the question is delicate. In such cases, the
answers given will very often have to be 'decoded' in
order to be understood correctly.. .The Chamber has
noted this in the proceedings.. .The Chamber also
noted the inexperience of witnesses with maps, film
and graphic representations of localities. In the light
of this understanding, the Chamber did not draw any
adverse conclusions regarding the credibility of
148 This process reflects the fact that, "[u]nlike national judges, international judges
do not inherit courts of law; they need to build them. The credibility and legitimacy
of their courts cannot be relied upon, but must be established. International judges
are keenly aware that while their decisions can be sweeping and influential, they
work in fragile institutions." Id. at 103-04.
149 Id. at 1 8.
"0 Akayesu, supra note 133, at 131 (the judgment also asserts that the judges of the
Tribunal are "not restricted under the Statute of the Tribunal to apply any particular
legal system and is not bound by any national rules of evidence...").
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witnesses based only on their reticence and their
sometimes circuitous responses to questions.15 1
The Trial Chamber 52 also noted the potentially adverse effect that
post-traumatic stress could have on the internal consistency of
witness statements:
The Chamber is unable to exclude the possibility that
some or all of these witnesses actually suffer from
post traumatic or extreme stress disorders, and has
therefore carefully perused the testimonies of these
witnesses... Inconsistencies or imprecisions in the
testimonies, accordingly, have been assessed in the
light of this assumption.1 53
These judicial pronouncements reveal a unique degree of sensitivity
toward, and awareness of, the nexus between varying cultural
understandings of even basic facts and the Trial Chamber's duty to
evaluate the credibility of evidence provided by Rwandan witnesses.
Akayesu also marks the first time in history that sexual
violence was judicially recognized as an act constitutive of
genocide.154 The Akayesu judgment defined it as "a physical invasion
of a sexual nature, committed on a person under circumstances
which are coercive."15 5 The ICTR ultimately acquitted Mr. Akayesu of
six charges but found him guilty on one charge of genocide, one
... Id. at T 155.
152 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, UN Doc. S/RES/955,
8 November 1994, Art. 10 (hereinafter, "ICTR Statute") (The Trial Chamber, which
includes the various courtrooms and judges' offices, is one of the Tribunal's three
main "organs," the other two being the Registry (the Tribunal's administrative
branch) and the Office of the Prosecutor (which conducts investigations and
prosecutions).
. Akayesu, supra note 133, at 143.
154 Lindsay Peterson, Note, Shared Dilemmas: Justice for Rape Victims Under
International Law and Protection for Rape Victims Seeking Asylum, 31 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP.L.REV. 509, 515 (2008).
15 Akayesu, supra note 133, at 688.
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charge of direct and public incitement to genocide and seven charges
of crimes against humanity for murder, torture and rape.156
As the international community's first judgment rendering
criminal liability for genocide, the Akayesu decision has served as an
influential and broadly cited 57 framework for furthering the
development of a law to not only punish, but also someday prevent,
such crimes. By broadening the scope of admissible evidence through
the explicit consideration of cultural and trauma-related
psychological factors affecting Rwandan witnesses, the Akayesu
judgment essentially broadened the scope of criminal law itself.158
The Akayesu judgment also reflects a unique degree of judicial
sensitivity toward the experiences of the survivors testifying,
reflecting a basic judicial understanding that the nature of such
violence is so unspeakably traumatic that a strictly formal adherence
to traditional Western legal standards of objectivity and evidentiary
admissibility may in fact serve to obscure, not sharpen, the Tribunal's
ability to apprehend the true nature of these events. 159
16 Id at section 8.
157 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Defining Rape Internationally: A Comment on
Akayesu, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 940, 956 n.74 (2006) (Akayesu's definition of
rape has been incorporated into the state criminal codes of California and Illinois:
"Incorporating Akayesu's insight, both California and Illinois define gender violence
for civil purposes in part to include '[a] physical intrusion or physical invasion of a
sexual nature under coercive conditions."').
158 Felman, supra note 80, at 123-24 (Criminal trials adjudicating mass atrocities
reveal "how the unprecedented nature of the injury inflicted on the victims cannot be
simply stated in a language that is already at hand. I would argue that the trial
struggles to create a new space, a language that is not yet in existence. This new
legal language and this new space in which Western rationality as such shifts its
horizon and extends its limits are created here perhaps for the first time in history
precisely by the victims' firsthand narrative.").
59 Tony Waters, Bureaucratizing the Good Samaritan: The Limitations of
Humanitarian Relief Operations 195 (2001) (The horrors of genocide can render
efforts to understand genocide literally unimaginable. For example, "[w]hen
confronted with evidence of the Holocaust in 1942, Supreme Court Justice Felix
Frankfurter said: 'I do not believe you.. .I do not mean that you are lying, I simply
said I cannot believe you."'); Stover & Weinstein, supra note 13 at 4 ("By imposing
a 'legal order' on what is often the irrational (power-driven though it may be), the
international community seeks to use criminal trials to contain and to deter violence,
and to discover the truth about specific events and to punish those responsible. Yet
truth, in the eyes of those most affected by collective violence, often lies not in the
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B. The Media Case
On December 3, 2003, the ICTR convicted three Rwandans for
using radio and newspaper media outlets to incite the general
Rwandan population to mass murder.160 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, more
popularly known as the "Media Case," provided the ICTR with an
opportunity to delve even deeper into the nexus between Rwandan
culture and the genocide.161 In delineating political advocacy, which
is generally protected by the right to free expression in customary
international law,162 from the charge of "direct and public
incitement," which gives rise to criminal liability under the ICTR's
charter, the Nahimana judgment cited this passage from Akayesu:
... [T]he Chamber is of the opinion that the direct
element of incitement should be viewed in the light of
its cultural and linguistic content. Indeed, a particular
speech may be perceived as 'direct' in one country,
and not so in another, depending on the
audience... The Chamber will therefore consider on a
case-by-case basis, whether, in light of the culture of
Rwanda and the specific circumstances of the instant
case, acts of incitement can be viewed as direct or not,
by focusing mainly on the issue of whether the
facts themselves but in their moral interpretation, and how facts are interpreted is
often manipulated and distorted by the very people who initiated the violence.").
160 Prosecutor v. Nahimana et. al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, Judgment and Sentence
(Dec. 3, 2003), Chapter V.
161 Timothy Gallimore, Ph.D., The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (1CTR) and its Contributions to Reconciliation in Rwanda, 14 NEW ENG. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 239, 247-48 (2008) (Defendants Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-
Bosco Barayagwize controlled and managed the state-controlled RTLM radio
station, and defendant Hassan Ngeze founded, owned, and edited the Kangura
newspaper: "In the so-called 'Media Case,' the Tribunal set the principle that those
who use the media for inciting the public to commit genocide can be punished for
their communication because it amounts to a persecution as a crime against
humanity.").
162 See G.A. Res. 36/55, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 171, art. 1(1), U.N. Doc.
A/36/684, at 171 (Nov. 25, 1981). ("Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion...").
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persons for whom the message was intended
immediately grasped the implication thereof. 163
In the Media Case, the ICTR also adopted "the
comprehensive review of the historical context [of Rwanda] as
described in the Akayesu judgment."164 Although Mr. Akayesu was
held criminally liable for incendiary statements he articulated himself
and the Media Case defendants were being charged for facilitating
the hate speech of others through the media outlets they controlled,
the ICTR nevertheless adopted the subjective incitement standard
first laid out in Akaycsu. This is particularly noteworthy in light of the
fact that, since the common law doctrine of stare decisis does not exist
in international law, "international courts are not bound by
precedents, not even their own."165 The ICTR's decision to adopt
Akayesu's historical narrative and culturally subjective incitement
standard in the Media Case reveals a running thread of
jurisprudential emphasis on using popular Rwandan conceptions of
meaning as legal standards of proof.166
This trend of judicial deference toward Rwandan cultural
understandings may be viewed as a jurisprudential reaction to the
UN Security Council's decision to establish the ICTR outside of
Rwanda, in order to provide "some degree of distance from the
events in question" and "strengthen[] the perception of" the ICTR's
163 Nahimana, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T at T 1011 (citing Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-
96-4-T at 557-58).
1
64 Id. at 106.
165 Terris, Romano & Swigart, supra note 127, at 115.
166 Ida L. Bostian, Cultural Relativism in International War Crimes Prosecutions:
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 12 ILSA J INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 30
(2005) (noting that the its judgments show that the Tribunal's "interpretation and
implementation of a universal norm - the prohibition against genocide - was
informed and assisted by a consideration of the specific cultural context in which a
potential genocide occurred. Conceivably, the Tribunal could have adopted a rigid,
radical universalist view that only ethnic groups as defined by objective western
sociologists would meet the definition under the Genocide Convention. Instead, the
Tribunal correctly recognized the fluidity of culture and context, and did justice to
the real-world experience of the Rwandan Tutsis.").
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impartiality. 167 Essentially, the ICTR's efforts to transform Rwandan
cultural understandings into standards of legal proof represent a
unique use of jurisprudence itself to bridge the gap of geographic,
cultural and legal distance between the ICTR judges and Rwandans
themselves.
The ICTR has also developed other judicial methods of
transforming collective understandings of the Rwandan genocide.
For example, in 2006 the Appeals Chamber took judicial notice1 68 that
the commission of genocide against the Tutsis in 1994 is a "fact of
common knowledge." 169 Although this decision appears to be
intended intended to sharpen the Trial Chambers' focus on the
adjudication of individual guilt by cutting broader arguments about
whether a genocide occurred at all from the proceedings, it renders
the ICTR vulnerable to charges of effectively violating the doctrines
of individual responsibility 170 and presumption of innocence. 171
167 Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Image and Reality of War Crimes Justice: External
Perceptions of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 26 FLETCHER
FORUM OF WORLD AFF. 21, 44 n.16 (2002).
168 Definition of "Judicial Notice," LAW.COM LEGAL DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.
law.com/Default.aspx?selected=1065 (last visited March 13, 2012) (Judicial notice
is "the authority of a judge to accept as facts certain matters which are of common
knowledge.. .without the need for evidence establishing the fact.").
169 Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-AR73(C), Decision on
Prosecutor's Interlocutory Appeal of Decision on Judicial Notice, 35 (June 16,
2006).
70 The concept of individualized, as opposed to collective, guilt is central to the
Tribunal's jurisprudence; for example, see Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, Case No. ICTR-
99-46-T, Judgment, 35 (Feb. 24, 2005) ("The Chamber emphasizes.. .that the
accused must be informed not only of his own alleged conduct giving rise to
criminal responsibility but also of the acts and crimes of his alleged... accomplices.
Thus, pleading accomplice.. responsibility does not obviate the Prosecution's
obligation to particularize the underlying criminal events for which it seeks to hold
the accused responsible.").
171 David L. Nersessian, The Razor's Edge: Defining and Protecting Human Groups
Under the Genocide Convention, 36 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 293, 304 n.68 (2003) ("As
hybrids of the inquisitorial civil and adversarial common law systems, the
[international criminal] tribunals must both opine the law and make detailed factual
findings while ensuring that the accused benefits from the presumption of innocence
and that the prosecution establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."); see also
Kevin Jon Heller, Note: International Decisions: Prosecutor v. Karemera, 101 AM.
J. INT'L L.. 157 (2007).
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Dr. Timothy Gallimore, former Spokesperson for the ICTR's
Prosecutor, has noted that the ICTR's decision to take judicial notice
of the genocide as an irrefutable historical fact "may vindicate some
genocide victims and survivors by its public recognition of their
victimization and moral injury," which is exactly "what many victims
want most from the legal process."172 If one takes the view that the
ICTR's creation was motivated by a degree of collective guilt for the
international community's inaction during the Rwandan genocide,
taking judicial notice of the genocide's irrefutability represents an
implicit admission that action should have been taken.
The ICTR's decision to build its jurisprudence upon a
judicially authored narrative of Rwandan history also illustrates a
broader internal tension within the ICTR that underlies much of its
work: the difference between adjudicating the individual guilt of
defendants and creating an accurate and reliable historical record of
what happened in 1994.173 The creation of an accurate and impartial
historical record that validates the reality and truth of what the
genocide survivors experienced is considered by many of those
working inside the ICTR to be central to fulfilling its mandate of
promoting peace and reconciliation.174 This emphasis on correlating
history and justice for the purpose of promoting reconciliation is a
uniquely modern phenomenon that has characterized international
criminal tribunals since Nuremberg.175
172 Gallimore, supra note 161, at 255.
173 The most surprising aspect of my interaction with ICTR judges was the fact that
most of them personally share the grievances most commonly articulated by the
ICTR's critics. One of the most commonly discussed problems ICTR judges
mentioned during my time there was the tension between adjudicating the individual
guilt of ICTR defendants while simultaneously seeking to create a historical record
of mass trauma on a national scale.
174 This conclusion is drawn from my observations, interviews and experiences while
working inside the ICTR.
175 Felman, supra note 80, at 1 ("In the wake of Nuremberg, the law was challenged
to address the causes and consequences of historical traumas. In setting up a
precedent and a new paradigm of trial, the international community attempted to
restore the world's balance by re-establishing the law's monopoly on violence, and
by conceiving of justice not simply as punishment but as a marked symbolic exit
from the injuries of a traumatic history: as liberation from violence itself.").
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C. The ICTR as a Judicial Author of Rwandan History
The "history-writing" function of the ICTR is central to the
paradox of impartiality, 176 which is why it simultaneously justifies
and problematizes the ICTR's cultural and geographic distance from
Rwanda itself. In the sense that constructing an impartial historical
narrative about Rwanda's ethnic divisions requires a certain degree
of dispassionate objectivity, the distance seems justified. But the price
of this objectivity is a minimization of the role of the same Rwandans
in whose name the ICTR was created:
[Any criminal proceedings implicate 'the people' in
whose name they are initiated as a community of
viewers... Any court decision, in a way, is a historical
decision about the significance, the meaning the
community derives from its spectatorial stance.177
Rwandan participation in ICTR proceedings has essentially been
limited to serving as witnesses and defendants, rendering the vast
majority of victims completely uninvolved in the ICTR's work; a
small number of Rwandans are given the opportunity to watch, and
an even smaller number the opportunity to participate.178
176 Michel Rosenfeld, Deconstruction and Legal Interpretation: Conflict,
Indeterminacy and the Temptations of the New Legal Formalism 11 Cardozo L. Rev.
1211, 1234 (1990) (paraphrasing literary theorist and legal scholar Stanley Fish:
"Law must absorb and internalize that which threatens it from the outside, and in
particular ethical and political values. But at the same time, law must deny that it is
appropriating extra-legal values. In other words, the law cannot simply carve for
itself a path that remains beyond ethics and politics. Yet the law cannot admit
dependence on the ethical and the political, for that would threaten to deprive law of
any distinct identity. To resolve this dilemma, the law simultaneously incorporates
ethical and political values and denies that it is doing so.").
77 Felman, supra note 80, at 81.
78 See Samantha Power, Rwanda: The Two Faces of Justice, THE NEW YORK
REVIEW OF BOOKS, Jan. 16, 2003, at 47, available at http://www.nybooks.
com/articles/archives/2003/jan/16/rwanda-the-two-faces-of-justice/ ("The UN court
is a world away from the people whom international justice claims to serve. The rare
Rwandan who tries to visit the UN court must take a bus through four countries to
get there.. .The journey takes two days, and costs around $40 for the bus ticket and
$20 for a Kenyan transit visa. This is more than most Rwandans earn in a month.").
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The issue of ethnicity requires the ICTR to grapple with a
similar paradox, placing it in "the untenable position of having to
recognize the importance of ethnic group identity for legal purposes
(establishing mens rea or motive for genocide) and at the same time
trying to minimize ethnicity when establishing individual guilt in
order to promote reconciliation."179 Because genocide involves the
depersonalization of the victim through the conflation of the targeted
individual within the targeted group, "the [ICTR's] recognition of
ethnic groups in Rwanda is a necessary element in the legal
determination of criminal responsibility for the genocide."18 0 The
ICTR has implemented procedures to keep the identities of witnesses
confidential. 181 However, the centrality of ethnicity in establishing
criminal liability for genocide means that, if the ICTR attempted to
prosecute these crimes without addressing ethnicity at all, "no one
could be convicted for the crimes, and the lack of successful
prosecution would only perpetuate the existing impunity."182
V. CONCLUSION
None of this is meant to minimize or invalidate the ways in
which many Rwandans feel the ICTR has let them down. 83 On
179 Gallimore, supra note 161, at 256.
so Id. at 257.
181 ICTR Statute, art. 21; see also Joanna Pozen, Justice Obscured: The Non-
Disclosure of Witnesses'ldentities in ICTR Trials, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 281,
296 (2006) (A majority of "witnesses seeking protective measures from the Tribunal
are Rwandans who reside in Rwanda, although a few live abroad. The Tribunal's
statute requires the [ICTR] to provide measures for the protection of victims and
witnesses... Of the witnesses that come to testify at the [Tribunal], a large number
invoke this statutory provision and request protection. Granting these requests often
conflicts with an accused's statutory right to a 'fair and public hearing,' because
some forms of witness protection restrict the defense's ability to cross-examine.
However, the [Tribunal's] statute provides no guidance for judges on how to resolve
this tension between the rights of the accused and the safety of the witness.").
182 Gallimore, supra note 161, at 257.
183 Eugenia Zorbas, Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 1 AFR. J. LEGAL
STUD. 29, 34 (2004) ("It is nearly impossible to overstate the bitter disappointment
and ill will the [Tribunal's] alleged rampant corruption, bureaucracy, incompetence
and above all, its meagre results - ten convictions in nearly ten years - all on a
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average, the total cost of prosecuting a single ICTR defendant is $80
million. 184 Although this may be a trivial amount of money on the
scale of international politics, for a nation as impoverished as
Rwanda 8 5 it is a vast sum that could be used to rebuild Rwandan
society in more tangible ways.186 The ICTR has also been criticized for
lenient sentencing.187 Apart from these issues, the most common
criticism of the ICTR among Rwandans is that it "provides
perpetrators of genocide more rights and amenities than victims" 188
and that the proceedings are too slow and selective. 189
multi-million dollar annual budget, has generated with the RPF government, the
Rwandan people and internationally.").
184 Mark A. Drumbl, Lav and Atrocity: Settling Accounts in Rwanda, 31 Ohio N.U.
L. Rev. 41, 46 (2005). Apart from the length and complexity of most trials at the
Tribunal, the sheer size of the institution is largely responsible for its high cost of
operation. See Terris, Romano & Swigart, supra note 127 at 161 ("In 2006-2007, the
criminal tribunals together commanded approximately 7 percent of the regular
budget of the United Nations, providing nearly twenty-two hundred jobs between
them... [these courts] are not simply courts where cases are heard. They are also the
home of enormous investigative operations (under the auspices of the offices of the
prosecutors), they are victim and witness protection organizations, and they operate
their own detention facilities.").
Shelley Thompson, 80 Simple Rules: The Effective and Sustainable 2009
Rwandan Microfinance Regulations, 38 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 415, 423
(2011) ("The 1994 genocide impoverished much of the population and had a
particularly harsh impact on women. A survey from year 2000 estimated that 60% of
the population was below the poverty line and 90% was engaged in subsistence
agriculture.").
1 Des Forges & Longman, supra note 11, at 37-8 ("The Rwandan government has
criticized the international community for investing more money in the ICTR than in
rebuilding the judicial system in Rwanda... A number of legal experts and political
analysts have echoed these sentiments, arguing that rebuilding Rwanda's domestic
judicial system should have been given priority over supporting the ICTR.").
187 See Sam Szoke-Burke, Avoiding Belittlement of Human Suffering: A Retributivist
Critique of ICTR Sentencing Practices, J. Int. Criminal Justice (2012), Vol. 10, Issue
03, pp. 561-580; in response to such criticisms, former ICTR President Judge Dennis
Byron stated that he believes "the certainty of punishment to be a greater deterrent
than the severity of the punishment." Interview with Hon. Dennis Byron, former
ICTR President, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in Arusha, Tanzania
(May 2007).
188 Karol C. Boudreaux & Puja Ahluwalia, Cautiously Optimistic: Economic
Liberalization and Reconciliation in Rwanda's Coffee Sector, 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 147, 162 (2009) ("High-ranking suspects at the [Tribunal] enjoy better
defense lawyers and judges than low-raking suspects who are tried in
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The ICTR, in negotiating a fragile balance between the
provision of defendants' rights and the achievement of reconciliation
and peace, is an institution operating at cross-purposes with itself.
The paradox of impartiality implicates the troubling legacy of
Western law in Rwanda,190 the contentious relationship between the
UN and Rwanda,191 and the unique complexities faced by non-
Rwandan judges seeking to both understand and "write" Rwandan
history. 192 Many of the ICTR's shortcomings, but by no means all, are
unavoidable byproducts of this paradox.193 Others are inherent in the
limitations of criminal justice itself,194 which is "not inherently
Rwanda... They also receive a higher quality of health care than victims.. many
Rwandans believe the [Tribunal] places too much emphasis on responding to the
rights of the accused and not enough to victims and survivors, including those who
serve as witnesses.").
89 Yacob Haile-Mariam, The Quest for Justice and Reconciliation: The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Ethiopian High Court, 22
HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 667, 736 (1999) ("The very slow pace of the
Tribunal is a source of frustration from the viewpoint of genocide survivors and their
relatives. The Rwandan courts, for example, began prosecuting defendants a year
after the [Tribunal] and disposed of four hundred cases by the middle of July 1998,
while the [Tribunal] had not completed trying even one case by the middle of August
1998. The slow pace has not augured well for reconciliation and is the major gripe
Rwanda has with the Tribunal.").
190 See discussion supra Part II.
191 See discussion supra Part III.
192 See discussion supra Part IV.
193 ERIC STOVER & HARVEY M. WEINSTEIN, Conclusion: A Common Objective, A
Universe ofAlternatives, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN
THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 335 (2004) (discussing two 2001 incidents
caused Rwandan survivor organizations to temporarily prohibit their members from
serving as prosecution witnesses at the ICTR: "In the first incident, the survivor
organizations condemned the tribunal after a stunning revelation that the court had
unknowingly employed a Hutu defense investigator who was a high-level genocide
suspect. In the second incident, the survivor organizations accused a panel ofjudges
of unprofessional conduct after laughing during the cross-examination of a Tutsi
rape victim. Although these incidents drew little international attention, they
became front-page news in Rwanda and continued to be scrutinized by the local
media for more than a year.").
194 Id. at 333 ("The reality is that the logic of law can never make sense of the logic
of mass atrocity, or how survivors and perpetrators will interpret it. This is
especially true in post-conflict situations where survivors believe the international
community could have intervened to stop the violence but failed to do so.. For many
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efficient, nor.. .completely effective in some instances." 195  The
inherent limitations of criminal law become exponentially more
complex when trying to adjudicate individual guilt for a mass trauma
on the scale of the Rwandan genocide. 196
It is encouraging that newer international criminal courts
have already begun learning from - and correcting - the ICTR's
mistakes in these and other areas. 197 For example, some ICTR
witnesses who were victims of sexual violence have described
"feeling re-violated by the experience" of being subject to cross-
examination.198 Learning from these experiences, the ICC Statute has
codified procedures for treating victims of sexual violence into its
Statute 99 and Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 200 Although
survivors, tribunal justice, with its complex and lengthy procedures and often low
sentences, fails to palliate the injustice of losing family members and neighbors and
of witnessing the destruction in their communities. Meanwhile, those who have
been labeled perpetrators through the attribution of collective guilt often feel that
they have been singled out for retribution based on their ethnicity, without any
recognition of their own losses and suffering.").
195 David M. Crane, "Back to the Future" Reflections on the Beginning of the
Beginning: International Criminal Law in the Twenty-First Century, 32 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1761, 1769 (2009).
1 Stover & Weinstein, supra note 13 at 335 ("Criminal trials in the wake of mass
atrocity are inevitably limited and symbolic: a few war criminals stand for a much
larger group of guilty.").
197 See Valerie Oosterveld, Gender-Sensitive Justice and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda: Lessons Learned for the International Criminal Court, 12
NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 119, 128-9 (2005) (noting that those negotiating the
Rome Statute creating the ICC were aware of lessons learned from the Tribunal's
lapses of sensitivity toward sexual violence victims by "incorporating articles
relating to gender-sensitive investigations, with provisions on staffing the [ICC] with
individuals with relevant, gender-sensitive expertise" as well as designing
prosecution strategies formally requiring the ICC Trial Chamber to "be vigilant in
controlling the manner of questioning of a victim or witness to avoid harassment or
intimidation of a victim of sexual violence crimes.").
198 Id. at 130.
199 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (17
July 1998) (adopted 17 July 1998 at the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court) at arts.
54(1)(b), 68(1) and 68(2).
200 Rep. of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court,
Finalized Draft Text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/ 1/Add.1 at rule 88 (2000).
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problems like these are deeply troubling, indications that newer and
permanent institutions like the ICC are taking affirmative steps to
mitigate them hold the potential for transforming even the ICTR's
failures into a more effective system of international criminal law.201
Future international courts should also implement formal
mechanisms to educate judges who may be unfamiliar with the
domestic history and culture of the countries where these crimes
occur. By requiring ICTR judges from foreign jurisdictions to
complete an educational program exploring the social, cultural,
ethnic, and linguistic history of Rwanda, these judges would be
better equipped to evaluate evidence in the context of Rwandan
culture. Without the benefit of such a program, many newly
appointed ICTR judges are tasked with the responsibility of
informally familiarizing themselves with Rwandan culture, while
presiding over the trial proceedings. A formal program for helping
non-Rwandan judges familiarize themselves with Rwanda before
conducting their first trials would simultaneously facilitate the
conservation of judicial resources, while enhancing the accuracy of
the ICTR's judgments.
Ultimately, the best defense of the ICTR's work lies in the fact
that almost the entire interim government of the Rwandan genocide
era has been placed on trial at the ICTR.202 Despite all of its
limitations, mistakes, and failures, this will be the most important
part of the ICTR's legacy for the future. Condemnations of world
leaders and governments who systematically murder their own
citizens now have the force of a new, not yet perfectly effective, but
growing body of law to back them up. The expectation that such
actions will be met with impunity in the international community is
much less realistic now than it was in 1994.
201 Oosterveld, supra note 197, at 133 ("As a result of lessons learned from the
[Tribunal's] history, those involved in the ICC negotiations worked to codify
positive approaches to gender-sensitive justice into the Rome Statute, the ICC's
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, and the ICC's Elements of Crimes. It is in this
way that the [Tribunal's] experiences are reflected in the ICC's policies and
procedures.. .given that the ICC can rely on the lessons of the [Tribunal].. it should
experience fewer problems than its predecessor tribunals.").
202 Gallimore, supra note 161, at 243.
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The personal demands required of those who work at the
ICTR are tremendous. 203 Above and beyond the personal demands,
however, the professional challenges are immense by any standard.
The synthesis of cultural, national and legal traditions these judges
have created has breathed life into an idea that was nothing more
than a utopian dream a century ago. Although genocide is as old as
history itself,204 and we are still far from a system of international law
capable of preventing genocide, the judges of the ICTR have given the
world the next best thing: a law capable of punishing genocide.
203 See Nigel Eltringham, "A War Crimes Community?": The Legacy of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda Beyond Jurisprudence, 14 New Eng. J.
Int'l & Comp. L. 309 (noting that the personal sacrifices Tribunal judges are
required to make include: prolonged separation from family; disruption of domestic
professional life and career opportunities; and the significant emotional toll of
adjudicating atrocities on the scale of genocide).
204 See Deuteronomy 20:16-17 (King James) ("But of the cities of these people,
which the Lord thy God doth give thee for an inheritance, thou shall save alive
nothing that breatheth; but thou shalt utterly destroy them...").
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